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Christian Karner
Signs of the Nation: 
Resisting Globalization?
A cross large parts of Europe, and beyond, we are currently witnessing 
a curious phenomenon of what may be most succinctly described as a semio-
tic merging of hitherto arguably separate social domains: those of consumer 
capitalism, on one hand, and of various symbolisms of national identity, history 
and (self-)ascription on the other. Prominent manifestations of this include 
what has come to be called nation branding (Dinnie 2007). This is the phe-
nomenon of nation-states now concerning themselves particularly with their 
economic image and employing brand consultants, to measure and rank the 
associations their people, products, governments, culture, education, tourist 
attractions, and lifestyle trigger internationally (http://www.simonanholt.com), 
to ascertain possible business beneÞ ts. In its unapologetically instrumentalist 
register with singularly economic undertones this is a marked departure from 
nation-states well-known but much older pre-occupation with their world 
position (Spillman 1997), or wider standing in the international order, that 
was formerly tied to geo-political importance, historical image and derived 
symbolic status. Yet more poignantly, we are now surrounded by national ß ags 
not just in their traditional spaces (e.g. ß ag posts, international borders, 
ofÞ cial documents and buildings) but we see them being worn and carried 
as markers  of exactly what I will attempt to illuminate in this paper  on 
t-shirts, bags and consumer items of many other kinds. These, and this is my 
starting assumption, are evocations of the nation qualitatively different from, 
for example, an oath of allegiance being sworn or a national anthem being 
sung, as the latter are largely non-commodiÞ ed cultural-political practices. 
What, then, is this apparent blurring of the world of commodities and the domain 
of national symbolism all about, how might we read it, and which theoretical and 
methodological tools might help us in the process? In what follows, I discuss 
these questions by drawing on a series of discursive-visual snapshots from 
various European contexts, while focusing on the theoretical work demanded 
by this curious blurring of the national and the bought and sold.
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In wider conceptual terms, and keeping with the overall spirit of this volume, 
this essay also offers some inter-disciplinary reß ections on the value of signs, 
and the concept of sign values, as mirrors of social formations, identities and 
changes. In doing so, this essay takes Jean Baudrillards work as a point of 
departure, but regards it as merely one theoretical node in a wider concep-
tual web to be woven in what follows. I begin by theoretically contextualizing 
my subsequent exploration of how the conspicuous blurring of consumerist and 
national(ist)-symbolic practices can be approached methodologically and con-
ceptually. Central to my discussion is the question as to which existing social and 
cultural theories help illuminate what turn out to be two very different drivers 
of the blurring of national symbols and commodities: Þ rst, the instrumentalist, 
arguably distinctly late capitalist (Jameson 1991) marketization of historically 
entrenched, emotionally charged symbols; second, the bottom-up evocation 
of a purportedly formerly non-commodiÞ ed realm (e.g. the reiÞ ed nation) as 
a means of criticizing the perceived consequences of contemporary globalization. 
Theoretical Contextualization
As a Þ rst step in this discussion I propose to (re)turn to three seminal the-
oretical threads with a view to indicating how they may be productively inter-
-woven in the service of an analysis of commodiÞ cation, the effects of social 
crises, and the characteristics of contemporary globalization. 
With his inß uential reading of economic anthropology and the historical 
schematization he derives from it, Jean Baudrillard provides a pertinent point 
of conceptual departure for my later argument: 
Alluding to primitive [sic!] societies is undoubtedly dangerous  it is nonetheless neces-
sary to recall that originally the consumption of goods  does not answer to an indivi-
dual economy of needs but is a social function of prestige and hierarchical distribution  
Goods and objects must necessarily be produced and exchanged (sometimes in the form of 
violent destruction) in order that the social hierarchy be manifest (Baudrillard 1981: 30).
Invoking Malinowski, Baudrillard thus observes a historically clear, tho-
ugh now vanished category distinction between economic function and sign 
function; while the former characterizes conventional commercial activity, 
the latter was epitomized by symbolic exchanges  such as the Trobrianders 
kula, the closely scripted circulation of ritual objects  that both organized and 
reß ected a social system of values and status. The distinction between eco-
nomic and sign functions, which we may paraphrase as describing the differen-
ces between markets and traditional social hierarchies respectively, is comple-
mented by a further seminal opposition in Baudrillards work (1993): namely 
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that between the semiotic order of commodity exchange on one hand, and the 
symbolic order of gift-exchange and other pre-capitalist, socially embedded 
(Polanyi 2001) economic mechanisms on the other. As Mike Gane illustrates, 
Baudrillard concurs with Marcel Mauss in insisting on the superiority of the 
symbolic order over the semiotic order (the obligation of gift over the cash 
nexus) while witnessing the apparent destruction of the former by the lat-
ter; what is more, Baudrillard considers Marxs distinction between use- and 
exchange value insufÞ ciently radical and insists on the purportedly more 
fundamental conceptual contrast between symbolic exchange and commodity 
exchange (Gane 1993: x). The full heuristic force of this opposition emer-
ges from Baudrillards historical reading, proposing that although symbolic 
exchange is no longer the organizing principle of modern society, contem-
porary life is nonetheless still haunted by the symbolic, its hark[ing] back 
to primitive formations and its radical utopia  [that] intrude[s] at every 
level of contemporary society (Baudrillard 1993: 1). 
While Baudrillard, to whom we shall return in due course, arguably provi-
des analytical purchase with regard to the peculiarities of contemporary con-
sumer society, a second theoretical strand offers wider insights into structural 
changes and dislocations that give rise not only to such nostalgic hauntings 
and utopian intrusions but to a more general state of collective reß exivity and 
mobilization. This second theoretical thread is provided by Pierre Bourdieus 
early sociology. In Outline of a Theory of Practice, Bourdieu (1977: 7279) 
famously formulates his conceptualization of the habitus as consisting of the 
durable, transposable dispositions, cognitive and motivating structures, 
schemes of thought, perception and appreciation that facilitate regulated 
improvisation. Perhaps best thought of everyday cultural practice, and as such 
both informed by history and enabling structural reproduction, the habitus is 
closely related to doxa, or the universe of the undiscussed. It is there that 
Bourdieu locates structural transformations and the potential for their conte-
station. In moments of objective crisis, Bourdieu (1977: 168169) postulates, 
doxa  the realm of cultural commonsense  is potentially transformed into 
a politicized domain of reß ection, collective debate, and competing mobiliza-
tions; in periods of dislocation or far-reaching change, when the social world 
loses its character as a natural phenomenon, a previously taken-for-granted 
cultural doxa is thus turned into a universe of competing discourses. Super-
imposing Bourdieu on Baudrillard, then, one might read the displacement, 
or colonization, of the symbolic by the semiotic order typical of our liquid 
modern (Bauman 2000) consumer society as creating crises, and the symbolic 
hauntings observed by Baudrillard as amongst the discursive reactions gene-
rated by the consciousness-raising effects of such crises. Or, in the empirical 
terms of my later discussion, one may query if some appearances of national 
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symbols in the domain of markets and commodities are indicative of a crisis-
-induced harking back to an older, increasingly precarious symbolic order. 
The doxa-crisis-discourse model of change and reactions to it also has impli-
cations with regard to wider dimensions and experiences of globalization. My 
third pertinent theoretical strand is derived from Arjun Appadurais (1990: 
308) understanding of globalization as entailing a series of global ß ows 
(i.e.b technoscapes, mediascapes, Þ nancascapes, ideoscapes, ethnoscapes). Cru-
cially, Appadurai recognizes that the transnational circulation of technology, 
media messages, capital, ideas/images/ideologies, and people has not resulted 
in cultural standardization but, on the contrary, in tensions between the global 
and the local, in the mutual cannibalization of the forces of homogeneity 
and heterogeneity. Turning to select empirical examples next, this raises intri-
guing questions: How does this contest of sameness and difference (Appa-
durai 1990: 308) manifest in the cultural realm of signs? What role do various 
prominent national signs play here? How explicit or subtle, reß exive or non-
reß exive is such semiotic «cannibalization»? 
Commodifying the national? 
At this point, and to begin to address the questions just raised, the following 
snapshots appear to offer some of the required empirical momentum. 
Sport has long been recognized as a chief realm, within which national 
identities are deÞ ned, celebrated, performed and remembered (e.g. Edensor 
2002: 78). Continuing my introductory remarks I would now like to formu-
late the follow-on question as to what, if anything, happens to core symbols of 
national identity  and those who display or encounter them  when they are 
(re)appropriated for corporate, advertising purposes? There is no present shor-
tage of such seeming commodiÞ cation of national symbolisms. The particular 
example to be introduced here, and to which I shall return again later, is that 
of the appropriation of Austrias national ß ag by one of the countrys largest 
beer breweries  Stiegl, whose company colours match the Alpine Republics 
national colours (i.e. red-white-red). Stiegls online shop offers a wide range 
of commodities in red, or red-white-red: from beer-related items, to clothing 
(e.g. hats, headbands, winter jackets, watches, sunglasses, t-shirts), to sports 
items (e.g. footballs, retro Austrian football tops); and, most revealingly, 
a modiÞ ed Austrian ß ag, bearing Stiegls brand logo at the heart of the ß ags 
central white stripe (https://www.stiegl.at/eng/de/onlineshop/catalog/view/pro-
duct/14/317/). Advertised as an Austrian skiers supporters item, and going for 
 1.50, the item has also made regular and widespread appearances at home 
Þ xtures of the national football team, being waved by many in the crowds 
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of patriotic supporters. What, then, are we to make of a ß ag that is clearly 
recognizable as the national ß ag and encountered in a traditional setting for 
the performative celebration and assertion of national identities (i.e. amongst 
[home] supporters at international football matches), but to which, seemingly, 
a particular brand is also laying claim? 
A second snapshot, or perhaps more accurately a constant stream of such 
snapshots, is provided by the Union Jack as a currently near-ubiquitous feature 
on a vast range of consumer items. What is remarkable about this is two-fold: 
Þ rst, the fact that Union-Jack-bearing bags, t-shirts etc. can be spotted with 
remarkable regularity not only across the UK but also in cities on the conti-
nental side of the English channel; in the absence of consumer ethnographies 
one can only speculate if such items may currently carry connotations of cool 
Britannia, or assumed British trendiness, for their non-British users and custo-
mers. Second, the conspicuous display of the Union Jack on diverse kinds of 
fashion items (e.g. from jumpers and jackets to handbags, trousers, umbrellas, 
mobile phone cases etc.) constitutes a further signiÞ cant departure: while very 
particular items of material culture (e.g. the red phone box), industries (e.g. 
the northern factories of the Industrial Revolution), or brands (e.g. Rolls 
Royce, the Mini) have a long history of close association with Britain (Eden-
sor 2002: 176185), the current semiotic wave of commodiÞ ed Union Jacks is 
both quantitatively and qualitatively different  insofar as the ß ag now pops 
up on just about any purportedly fashionable commodity, whatever its brand, 
place of production, or geographically intended consumer audience. 
We begin to get a possible analytical handle on these snapshots by conside-
ring another seminal argument formulated by Arjun Appadurai (1988: 13, ita-
lics added), which replaces reiÞ ed (/fetishizing) deÞ nitions of particular objects 
as intrinsic commodities with an alternative focus on the commodity situation 
in the social life of any thing  [when] its exchangeability  [becomes] its 
socially relevant feature. The signiÞ cance of this approach to our present 
concerns becomes apparent in Igor Kopytoffs elaborations on the cultural 
biography of things that recognizes commoditization as a process. Kopytoff 
observes that although out of the total range of available things any given 
society considers only some appropriate as existing or potential commodities, 
such deÞ nitions are subject to change over time. Moreover, Kopytoff proposes 
a diametrical opposition between commoditization and culture: while the for-
mer homogenizes value, culture  here deÞ ned in the Durkheimian sense as 
a sacralizing force  resists commoditization by singularizing some things 
as being set apart and hence precluded from the potential onrush of the 
market; this applies, Kopytoff suggests, to the symbolic inventory of a society: 
public land  state art collections, the paraphernalia of political power, royal 
insignia, ritual objects and so on (Kopytoff, 1988: 64: 73). In light of these 
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arguments, our above snapshots  Stiegls Austrian ß ag and the commodiÞ ed 
Union Jack  might be read as indicating that national ß ags have now entered 
into a commodity situation, with national cultures no longer able to resist the 
onrush of the global market. Such a reading would add to Fredric Jamesons 
(1991) inß uential deÞ nition of late capitalism as characterized by the relentless 
commodiÞ cation of formerly extra-economic realms (i.e. nature and the uncon-
scious) (also see Karner 2008: 164). This then seems to suggest that national 
symbols are perhaps next in line to being colonized by multinational capital. 
Suggestive as this may appear, there are at least two reasons why our snap-
shots warrant closer examination and why they, and many others like them, may 
also be subject to alternative interpretations or at least pose further questions. 
The Þ rst indication is grounded in key semiotic insights concerning the poly-
semic character of complex communication (Tudor 1999: 66). With regard to 
national identities, such polysemy has been demonstrated most conclusively by 
Molly Andrews (2007) oral history revealing the contrasting meanings atta-
ched to the American ß ag, and uses made of it, by advocates and opponents 
of the Þ rst Gulf War respectively. Projected back onto my present examples, 
this ultimately makes a case for reception studies investigating how citizens-
-cum-consumers actually decode (Hall 1980) the commodiÞ ed versions of their 
(or others) national ß ags. However, this goes beyond the scope of the present 
paper and therefore has to remain the object of important future research. 
The second dimension that complicates the above reading of Stiegls (Austrian) 
ß ag and the ubiquitously branded Union Jack is the question of reß exivity 
or its absence. In his seminal work on Banal Nationalism, Michael Billig alerts 
us to how taken-for-granted aspects of the everyday are instrumental to the 
on-going and largely unnoticed reproduction of a world of nation-states. Pro-
minent amongst such quotidian forms of banal nationalism are the daily, ubi-
quitous but rarely reß exive waving of ß ags that surround us all and a range 
of linguistically microscopic  familiar habits of language, such as forms 
of linguistic deixis that operate beyond conscious awareness and reproduce 
social boundaries through the habitual use of personal pronouns (we, they, us, 
them) or other means of rhetorical pointing at here as opposed to there 
(Billig 1995: 3743; 94). What is more, Billig (1995: 44) also draws attention 
to the difference and relationship between such everyday, banal nationalism 
and moments of hot nationalist passion respectively. The latter constitutes 
a form of explicit, self-conscious social closure (Wimmer 2004: 6), a har-
dening of institutional boundaries and deliberate intensiÞ cation of social and 
symbolic exclusions imposed on the other. In terms of our earlier snapshots, 
this raises important questions as to whether those particular ß ags are being 
woven, worn and carried in acts of barely noticed banal nationalism or, 
alternatively, if they constitute self-aware expressions of hot nationalist pride. 
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Further, and as crucially, what are the social conditions conducive to banal 
nationalism turning hot? Or in Bourdieus earlier-quoted terminology, what 
are the speciÞ c crises transforming doxa, including peoples taken-for-granted 
and routinely practiced national identities, into competing discourses that inc-
lude forms of hot nationalism?
… Or appealing to that which lies beyond the market?
While I shall return to the issues just raised in due course, let me next introduce 
another empirical snapshot, one that indeed condenses the effects of crises as 
catalysts for reß exive mobilizations of national identiÞ cations and solidarities. 
However, this particular phenomenon also suggests that the nation is not 
only potentially subject to late capitalist commodiÞ cation, as suggested by the 
interpretation sketched above, but that it can serve as a vehicle and symbol 
of critique of, and resistance against, global market forces. 
This is shown by current, near pan-European campaigns for fair milk 
or, more accurately, for viable milk prices to be paid to local farmers. Coor-
dinated by the European Milk Board (http://www.europeanmilkboard.org) 
and its national members, the fair milk campaign reacts against the steady 
decline in milk prices since 2001, aggravated by rising production costs, which 
have jointly driven thousands of farmers across Europe out of business (http://
www.fairmilk.org/de/fairmilk/warum-kommt-die-faire-milch.html); the campa-
ign calls for fairer prices  to enable currently struggling farmers to continue, 
to safeguard unique agricultural land and scenery, and to sustain rural life 
across Europe, its high quality dairy production, and countries food sovere-
ignty (http://www.fairmilk.org/de/fairmilk/was-bewirkt-die-faire-milch.html). 
On a symbolic level, the fair milk campaign centres on life-sized Þ gures of 
the plastic cow Faironika, which can be spotted on Þ elds and at protests 
across Europe, signiÞ cantly always painted in its respective national colours 
(e.g. red-white-green in Italy, blue-yellow in Sweden etc.), and which signiÞ es 
farmers calls for sustainable prices and the associated future beneÞ ts to local 
producers, consumers and environments (http://www.fairmilk.org/de/fairmilk/
was-ist-die-faire-milch.html). Crucially, the respective national ß ags painted on 
Faironikas across the continent can here not be read as indicative of a widening 
commodiÞ cation of all things national: on the contrary, in these cases national 
symbolism works to invoke extra-economic solidarities and identiÞ cations and 
to channel discontent with, and opposition to, the consequences of seemingly 
unfettered, transnational market forces. In the terms of my theoretical point of 
departure, one may therefore propose that fair milk campaigns and the natio-
nal ß ags they utilise provide another instance of what Baudrillard describes
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as now marginalized symbolic orders still haunting, or intruding upon, 
contemporary consumer society.
Conceptually relevant here is Stephen Gudemans understanding of any 
economy as being shaped by a dialectical tension, whose speciÞ c forms and 
manifestations change with time and context, between the domain of the 
market and the domain of mutuality:
Shot through  with competition and mutuality, with antagonism and community, econ-
omy encompasses more than most economists  allow, and is more complex than most 
anthropologists realize  In part, individuals live from the competitive trade of goods, 
services and money that are separated or alienated from enduring relationships  But 
people also live from goods and services that make, mediate, and maintain social relation-
ships. Through mutuality or community things and services are secured and allocated, by 
means of continuing ties, such as taxation and redistribution; through cooperation in kin-
ship groups, households, and other groupings. (Gudeman 2012; 45, Þ rst two italics added).
Gudemans opposition between impersonal markets and enduring, mutual 
relations of support and solidarity enables us to read phenomena like Faironika 
and their appeals to long-established, national identiÞ cations (i.e. mutuality) in 
a struggle against the local consequences global market conditions, relations 
and forces. However, localities and nations are not, or no longer, alone in 
appealing to or making use of the value domain of mutuality. Discursive and 
semiotic invocations of the latter can indeed also be observed as top-down- 
or from-the-outside-in strategies. This is demonstrated by the fact that mul-
tinational corporations and brands have long discovered the national pull. To 
provide but one relevant illustration, McDonalds Austrias 2011 report on 
sustainability  not a concept the companys critics tend to credit fast-food 
giant McDonalds with  is worth mentioning. In a noteworthy semiotic form of 
national deixis (Billig 1995), the reports cover depicts a map of Austria. From 
there, it proceeds to tell the company branchs story and ethos as having been 
born in the USA, and now being made in Austria, as thinking globally, 
[and] acting locally. McDonalds Austria thus here portrays itself as a key 
investor in all things Austrian, as being committed to rules for fair dealings 
with one another, as a major employer in the regions, as showing social 
and environmental responsibility, and as being open to dialogue and critical 
discourse (McDonalds Austria 2011: 67, 13, 16; my translations). Whether 
an act of impression management in response to the companys critics or 
not, what matters for our present purposes is the fact that we here encoun-
ter a multinational corporation deliberately tapping into, as it has done for 
a number of years, and  one needs to acknowledge  supporting a mutuality 
domain: [McDonalds is] a major partner for Austrias agriculture ... [suppor-
ting] sustainable and regional production  beef, [now free-range] eggs, milk, 
bread and potatoes are 100% Austrian  we are the biggest gastronomical
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partner for Austrias farmers (McDonalds Austria 2011: 22, my translations). 
Such discursive and institutional entanglements between McDonalds and 
a national domain of mutuality notwithstanding, it is of course also clear that 
we are here witnessing a powerful, global market actor whose primary goals 
are inevitably set by business-considerations. 
Invocations of extra-economic ties and responsibilities are thus more typi-
cally articulated in bottom-up fashion, by the (relatively) disempowered or 
undeniably marginalized, whose appeals to the mutuality domain are less likely 
to work within, but more likely to actively criticize and oppose, the existing 
parameters set by global markets and their auxiliary institutions and actors. 
This is powerfully illustrated by the Occupy Movement, described as the Þ rst 
worldwide postmodern uprising (Brucato 2012: 77), one of whose chief advo-
cates portrays the movements critique of widening political and economic 
inequalities and resistance against neoliberalism as follows:
The Occupy movement has been repeatedly accused of being a protest without a cause. 
This is ß agrantly false. Its cause is the reform of the political economy of global capital-
ism  [T]he main demands are clear enough: Politics in the hands of the 99 percent, not 
of the 1 percent that control the large corporations  Rebuilding a mixed economy with 
a proper balance of markets and governments  Shifting public funds into training and 
education so that young people can develop the skills needed for gainful employment  
Taxing the rich and the Þ nancial sector  Building or rebuilding a social safety net and 
active labor market policies  Reinventing key services, such as health and education, 
to bring them within reach of everybody (Sachs 2012: 466; 473).
What is particularly noteworthy here is two-fold: Þ rst, the clear appeals 
to revive, re-invigorate or create mutuality domains that are, in this reading, 
depleted by unfettered market relations and the disempowerment of both 
governments and the vast majority of people; second, even though there are 
no national symbols at work here, this account nonetheless invokes political 
functions and provisions  the collection of taxes, education, social welfare 
etc.  that are generally those of the (nation-)state. It thus seems that in the 
absence of new local, transnational or global institutions, and even when devoid 
of national symbolism, the most vocal opposition to neoliberal globalization 
still relies on the structures and categories that underpin(ned) our world of 
nation-states. 
Language, myth, contextualization
Having introduced such diverse snapshots  Stiegl, the commodiÞ ed Union 
Jack, Faironika, and invocations of extra-economic mutuality domains by these 
most unlikely of bed-fellows (i.e. McDonalds and the Occupy Movement) 
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 it would appear that each of their analyses still requires further conceptual/
methodological momentum. I would like to propose, by way of my next argu-
mentative step, that such momentum can be derived from Roland Barthes 
(1972) seminal reading of myth as a semiological system.
In what is arguably his most inß uential text, at least in terms of the the-
oretical work accomplished therein, Barthes builds on Saussurean structural 
linguistics and its core premise  the tri-dimensional pattern of any sign as 
being constituted by, Þ rst, a signiÞ er (i.e. its outward form) and, second, a signi-
Þ ed (i.e. its meaning/concept), with the relation between them being a mat-
ter of cultural/linguistic convention. According to Barthes (1972: 114115), 
myth involves two semiological systems: a Þ rst (linguistic or visual) layer of 
conventional signs, per deÞ nition comprised of signiÞ ers-signiÞ eds; second, 
such fully constituted signs then act as signiÞ ers in a second-order semiolo-
gical system, which is the location of myth and deÞ ned as a metalanguage. 
Taking language itself, photography, painting, posters, rituals, objects, etc. as 
its raw materials, myth is thus constructed on top and on the basis of such 
Þ rst-order signiÞ cations; incorporating and building on semiological chain[s] 
which existed before it, myth develops a second system of distinctly ideological 
connotations. First order signs thereby act as signiÞ ers for a secondary layer 
of signiÞ cation, whose second-order signiÞ eds transmit myth; on this mythi-
cal layer, and amongst other features, historically contingent assumptions and 
ideas are naturalized, wherein Barthes detects a chief characteristic of ideology 
(Barthes 1972: 141142). Applied to our earlier snapshots, Barthes model 
suggests that each of them works not just in the obvious ways  as Þ rst order 
signs, or straightforward national ß ags that just happen to be variously worn, 
sold, bought, carried or painted onto plastic cows, or as particular invocations 
of a (national) realm partly beyond or outside the market  but that that they 
need more careful deciphering.
The conditio sine qua non to Barthes method of reading mythical/ideolo-
gical signiÞ cations is one of careful contextualization. This involves working 
closely from the mythological sign, on both of its two semiological layers, to 
its wider social contexts and back again. Barthes most famous example, that 
of a magazine cover depicting a Black soldier saluting the French ß ag, illu-
strates this: approached as myth, its analysis requires, as Barthes shows (1972: 
119), detailed contextual knowledge of the general History of France, its 
republican ethos (and concomitant assimilationism), French imperiality  
its colonial adventures, [and then] present difÞ culties. Only such detailed 
contextual information allows for the ideological assumptions transmitted by 
the second order signiÞ ers-signÞ eds to be extrapolated. Before sketching what 
this approach might add to the analysis of my snapshots, a reminder of what 
is at stake in them is in order. This is most succinctly provided by Kopytoffs 
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already quoted cultural perspective on commodities: the proposition that 
their production is not just a material  but also a cultural and cogni-
tive process whereby commodities are marked as being a certain kind of 
thing; this leads to Kopytoffs next realization, namely that the (contem-
porary Western) deÞ nition of physical objects and rights to them as the 
quintessential universe of commodities, and their diametrical opposition to 
the universe of individuation and singularization (e.g. people, or the para-
phernalia of political power), is highly context-speciÞ c and, as such, subject 
to change (Kopytoff 1988: 64). As suggested earlier, the semiotic/discursive 
blurring of national symbolism and the world of consumerism can plausibly be 
read as an indication of such a historical shift, with parts of the nation-states 
symbolic inventory (e.g. ß ags) seemingly being commodiÞ ed. Importantly, 
however, our snapshots work in ideologically diverse ways. Although each of 
them reveals various intrusions of the domain of national symbolism into the 
semiotic order of consumer capitalism (or vice versa, but generally a blurring 
of these social realms), their political motivations, or lack of motivation, and 
trajectories differ markedly. It is those very different ideological trajectories 
that Barthes-ian semiological analysis and its emphasis on contextualization
can help illuminate. 
Thus returning to my Þ rst snapshot, Stiegls appropriation of the Austrian 
ß ag, such contextualization needs to include the following: Austrias post-1945 
history of national identity redeÞ nition and renegotiation, in gradual and gro-
wing opposition to previously dominant, pan-Germanic self-understandings (e.g. 
Bruckmüller 1992: 262) and, until the mid-1980s, in widespread distortion of 
Austrias Second World War history informed by what has come to be known 
as the victim myth (e.g. Uhl 2006). The post-war period of economic and 
ideological reconstruction led to an era of growing prosperity and remarkable 
political stability, in which by the 1980s and into the 1990s Austrians reported 
levels of patriotic pride that ranked amongst the highest in Europe and bey-
ond, at one point even surpassing those recorded in the US (Rathkolb 2005: 
2526). Particularly relevant here are the most commonly identiÞ ed objects 
of such national pride: in a much-cited survey from the mid-1980s, for exam-
ple, Austrians ranked the countrys scenery, historical treasures, and  most 
importantly for our present purposes  sporting achievements as their main 
sources of patriotic pride and attachment (Reiterer 1988: 118119). The period 
since the mid-1980s has been deÞ ned by diverse crises and far-reaching social 
and political transformations, many of them tied to the globalizing pressures 
and forces typical of our era of liquid modernity (Bauman 2000). As I have 
shown elsewhere (Karner 2005; 2011), such successive and far-reaching cri-
ses have  in Bourdieu-ian fashion  transformed a previously stable national 
habitus, generally positively connoted but largely taken-for-granted for many, 
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into a discursive realm of cultural-historical reß ection, intense debate and 
political polarization; both Austrias version of the neo-nationalisms (e.g. see 
Gingrich and Banks 2006) that have swept Europe over the last decade and 
a half and some prominent reactions against it can very plausibly be read in 
precisely these terms. Taken together, and in line with a Barthes-ian approach, 
all these contextual factors suggest that there is indeed more to be said about 
Stiegls ß ag than it being a form of banal nationalism being commodiÞ ed; on 
its mythical-ideological layer, it echoes the signiÞ cance of sports  particu-
larly skiing but also moments in the countrys football history  to prominent 
Austrian self-understandings, while also inadvertently reß ecting (the Alpine 
Republics) recent history: the close, sometimes uneasy proximity  arguably 
epitomized by the companys logo superimposed on the Austrian ß ag  of glo-
balizing, commercializing pressures and patriotic attachments. 
The beginnings of a critical, Barthes-ian reading of the widespread com-
modiÞ cation of the Union Jack, meanwhile, arguably requires contextualiza-
tion in relation to what Paul Gilroy has termed postcolonial melancholia, 
which relates an often un-reß ected upon pain of the loss of former imperial 
power and global standing to opposition to the intrusive presence of  inco-
ming strangers (Gilroy 2004: 110). As acknowledged earlier, this discussion 
cannot purport to illuminate the motivations and decodings of individuals 
bearing Union Jacks on their consumer items, which would require different 
methodological strategies that lie beyond the scope of the present essay. As 
such, however, my argument is in line with Roland Barthes approach to con-
textualizing myth which, rather than focusing on the readings by particular 
members of its intended audiences, captures the wider connotative domains of 
which myth is a part and the social contexts out of which it emerges. I would 
like to propose, then, that the contemporary British connotative domain to 
the (commodiÞ ed) Union Jack includes British postcolonial melancholia in 
one of its manifestations: growing and ever more visible opposition to Euro-
pean Union membership. The latter has built on what have historically been 
already high levels of EU-scepticism, with a recent further increase in British 
opposition to Brussels, the discursive metonym of all things constructed as 
unwanted European impositions, reß ected in the electoral successes of the 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) as well as in the governments 
promise, subject to a Conservative electoral win in 2015, of a referendum on 
Britains future (non-)EU-membership. In some of its manifestations, current 
anti-Europeanism in the UK can be described as a form of social closure 
(Wimmer 2004), along national boundaries and in opposition to the perceived 
consequences of intra-European migration. This shows, for instance, in the 
widespread discursive tendency, in and beyond the tabloid press, to particularly 
construct Eastern European migrants as a strain on public resources, as a threat 
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to British workers, or as beneÞ t tourists (see, for example, Daily Telegraph 
2013). Such sentiments and discourses opposing intra-European mobility seem 
utterly impervious to the far more complex socio-economic realities revealed 
by a current study that has shown that recent European migrants, in particular, 
have made a positive Þ scal contribution, even  when the UK was running 
budget deÞ cits (Dustmann and Frattini 2013: 1). These contextual dimen-
sions allow for the following reading of the connotative and social contexts to 
the current pervasiveness of commodiÞ ed Union Jacks, bearing in mind that 
signiÞ ers of identity inevitably mark self-other boundaries: they suggest, to 
re-appropriate Paul Gilroys (1991) most famous terminology, that at present 
there aint no, or only very little, European blue in the Union Jack; and that the 
cultural pessimism and economic chauvinism (Gingrich and Banks 2006) 
detected in the neo-nationalisms of Europes smaller (but afß uent) countries 
have, in the context of a prolonged economic crisis and far-reaching austerity, 
also got the UK Þ rmly in their grasp.
Within present constraints of space, what might we say about the social 
contexts and mythical-ideological connotations of my other snapshots? In rela-
tion to Faironika and the fair milk campaigns, contextualization must cover 
the market conditions faced by Europes dairy farmers. Those are summari-
zed by the European Milk Board (EMB) as follows: a ß ooding of the mar-
ket, particularly since 2008, that has led to large surpluses and, consequ-
ently, a drastic drop in milk prices approximating, at times, half of farmers 
production costs; against this backdrop, the EMB calls for a reformed poli-
tical framework to secure milk production that is economically, ecologically 
and socially sustainable for 500 million European consumers; it advocates 
European countries right to food sovereignty and calls for healthier market 
conditions; key to the latter are the future avoidance of surpluses, producers 
being able to make a living through the market rather than having to rely on 
public funds, and a degree of protectionism against the systematic dumping 
[through] low-price imports of milk and dairy products (EMB Positions 2013). 
Read through our theoretical framework, Faironika  and its self-reß exive 
use of national colour symbolism  can thus be read as a form of ideologi-
cal protest against market conditions that are widely perceived to be unjust 
and to disadvantage local farmers; fair milk campaigns therefore appeal to 
national solidarities with our farmers, employing the deixis of (banal) natio-
nalism in the service of a political-economic struggle against a market domi-
nated by large, multinational agro-business. This is further reß ected in the 
EMB current participation, along with 60 European civil society groups, in 
the Alternative Trade Mandate Alliance, which criticizes the EUs existing 
trade policy and advocates an alternative that puts people and the planet
before big business: 
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The current trading system isnt working. Tons of food  get thrown away while millions 
of people go hungry. EU trade policy has played a signiÞ cant role in  exacerbating the 
current crises in our economy, food, energy and the environment. But the recent launch 
of the EU-US trade negotiations shows that the EU wants more of the same, namely 
destructive trade agreements which eliminate social and environmental safeguards in the 
pursuit of corporate proÞ t (EMB News Details 2013).
And how about McDonalds Austria and the Occupy Movement respecti-
vely? Contextualization with regard to the former, and its perhaps surprising 
discursive commitment (which to the companys critics may appear to be mere 
lip service) to regional production and sustainability, requires us to recognize 
the widespread popularity and strength of the movement for locally produ-
ced, ideally organic food in Austria. This was reß ected, for example, in a 1997 
petition against genetically modiÞ ed food signed by 1.2 million Austrians (of 
a population of just over 8 million); or by the fact that since 2008 Austria has 
had the worldwide largest proportion of organic farmers, who by 2006 were 
cultivating 13.5 percent of agricultural land, compared to a considerable more 
meagre 3.4 percent across the rest of the EU (Gruber and Bohacek 2006: 11; 
49). Against this backdrop, it is of course hardly surprising that a multinational 
corporation such as McDonalds would, through its Austrian branch, come to 
embrace a national/regionalist/localist discourse. Indeed, it surely makes very 
good business sense to do precisely that. 
Finally, let us brieß y return to the Occupy Movement, which started as 
Occupy Wall Street in September 2011 and subsequently extended transna-
tionally, arguably to become Occupy Global Capitalism, a popular revulsion 
against a global economic system that has caused vast inequalities in income, 
claimed new victims of poverty and unemployment, and that lacks a moral 
and political framework oriented to the needs of the millions of people being 
left behind by global economic change (Sachs 2012: 463). As argued earlier, 
the movements most signiÞ cant facet to the present discussion is that it also 
Þ rmly focuses on an extra-economic mutuality domain which it deÞ nes, in 
stark contrast to McDonalds or other multinationals adopting a register of 
(regional) sustainability, as diametrically opposed to the (global) market. This 
emerges, for example, from an essay about the Occupy Movement by Law-
rence Weschler (2012: 397) who describes the concept of absolute human rights 
(e.g. the right not to be tortured  to secure lodging, a decent livelihood, 
adequate health care) as a magical assertion in the face of, and in opposi-
tion to, the tyranny of the market. I earlier suggested that as a social move-
ment opposed to neoliberal globalization and to consumerism as, arguably, its 
cultural ethos and ideology of legitimation, the Occupy Movement may not 
have employed national symbolism but that it nonetheless appealed to social 
functions primarily associated with the (nation-)state. However, more detailed 
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contextualization reveals the movements ideological trajectory more fully, its 
ethos of anti-consumerist resistance and an apparent willingness to organise 
and think outside established social and political categories:
The occupation encampments [in] approximately 1,400 cities in fall 2011 provided a vivid 
template for the 99 percents growing sense of unity. Here were thousands of people  
from all walks of life, living outdoors in the streets and parks, very much as the poorest 
of the poor have always lived: without electricity, heat, water, or toilets. In the process, 
the managed to create self-governing communities. General Assembly meetings brought 
together an unprecedented mix of recent college graduates, laid-off blue-collar workers, 
and  the chronically homeless  What started as a diffuse protest against economic 
injustice became a vast experiment in class building. The 99 percent, which might have 
seemed a purely aspirational category early in the fall of 2011, began to will itself into 
existence (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 2012: 305). 
Concluding reflections
Needless to stress that the contextualization and Barthes-inspired readings of 
my chosen snapshots offered here are incomplete, merely tentative sketches, 
so-to-speak. Each of them clearly calls for further research and commentary. 
This having been said, and by way of a conclusion, I would like to do more 
than merely call for more empirical research, self-evidently necessary though 
this is. To connect some of the threads of the theoretical web I promised to 
weave at the outset, let us brieß y return to Jean Baudrillard or, more accura-
tely, to some of the secondary literature about his work: 
Baudrillards argument is that the conspicuous consumption  analysed by Veblen in 
his Theory of the Leisure Class has been extended to everyone in the consumer society  
Whereas such display is conÞ ned to the upper classes in Veblens book, Baudrillard sees 
the entire society as organized around consumption  through which individuals gain 
prestige, identity, and standing  Baudrillard  argues that capitalism establishes social 
domination through [this] imposition of a system of sign values ... This model rules out 
in advance, however, the possibility that consumption might be a sphere of self-activity 
... An alternative perspective on consumption is found in the work of Michel de Certeau 
... [who] shows various ways in which consumption can serve  self-valorization and  
promote the interests of individuals and oppositional groups against the hegemony of 
capital (Kellner 1989: 21; 27).
Kellners comments enable us to distil key insights generated by the pre-
sent essay. First, our snapshots raise the intriguing question as to how to read 
national symbolism that has seemingly become part of the system of consu-
merist sign values. As we have seen, some such examples (e.g. Faironika) can 
be read as intrusions of a symbolic order, through which opposition to the 
hegemony of capital is indeed articulated. Second, and in partial divergence
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from Certeaus focus, examples such as the fair milk campaign say less about 
individual consumers acts of resistance in the realm of daily life than they do 
about the collective mobilizing potential of symbols of locality, regionalism 
or the nation, as mythical signiÞ ers of the purportedly familiar and trustwor-
thy, in an era dominated by global market forces. Third, and as we have also 
seen, this does not capture the different ideological trajectories of all of our 
snapshots, some of which require more careful contextualization in relation to 
their respective national histories, to present crises, or to some of the social 
movements responding to them. 
Looked at in conjunction, and their multi-directional ideological trajecto-
ries notwithstanding, our snapshots echo parts of Appadurais seminal depic-
tion of globalization as entailing multiple transnational ß ows (i.e. of people, 
ideas, Þ nance, images, technology etc.) as well as a resulting contest between 
the forces of sameness and difference. What is more, Bourdieus doxa-cri-
sis-discourse model also resonates in some of our examples and their wider 
contexts. As a Þ nal theoretical note and node, Kellners above cross-reference 
to Michel de Certeau provides interesting food for thought. Key to Certeaus 
discussion in The Practice of Everyday Life (1984) is the opposition between 
individuals (i.e. discussed as consumers, readers, workers, pedestrians etc.) and 
the web of power that surrounds them; while the former employ tactics of 
resistance and temporary escape (e.g. workers spending time on the job other 
than intended by their employers), power controls space and is exercised thro-
ugh various strategies. Certeaus conceptualization of power and resistance 
can be summarized by the following sets of relations:
Power : resistance :: strategies : tactics :: control of space : manipulation/
diversion of time
When read through Zygmunt Baumans depiction of liquid modernity, for 
example, empirical examples like the ones examined in this essay point towards 
the following conceptual adjustment to, or partial inversion of, Certeaus fra-
mework:
Power : resistance :: time/tactics : space/strategies :: capital : nations :: mobi-
lity : Þ xedness 
Rather than mere theoretical trickery, these altered relations echo our 
earlier snapshots and offer insights into the power dynamics of our contem-
porary era. Nation states, quintessential modern power containers able to 
control (their) space/territory, thus now Þ nd themselves at the mercy of what 
Bauman (2000) describes as nomadic capital; the latters local investment 
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has become temporary, until-further-notice; ultimately, power therefore now 
rests in mobility, the ability to ß ow, to relocate at a whim. Conversely, being 
spatially rooted and Þ xed seem to have become hallmarks of relative power-
lessness and disadvantage vis-à-vis mobile capital, whose Þ ckleness, whose 
time-bound, merely temporary presence, arguably now holds yesteryears chief 
power-player (i.e. the nation state) hostage. Each in their own way, our snap-
shots reß ect different facets of, and diverse responses to, this new geometry 
of power. 
